We don’t talk enough about the tunnel rats from Vietnam. That’s a level a bravery that’s not even human.
“Here’s a knife and a flashlight. Go into this tunnel and go kill some some guys. Watch out for the bamboo viper booby traps (they’d nail their tales to a board), the trip wires, and the bamboo shoots the VC will stick through your neck so you can’t move.”
In 1946, the Viet Minh were the Viet Cong resistance fighters who began digging the tunnels and bunkers to combat the French, whom they would eventually defeat.
By the time the Vietnam War broke out, the Viet Cong had over 100 miles of tunnels with which to spring deadly ambushes on American and South Vietnamese forces before vanishing.
It was the duty of the Tunnel Rat to slide alone into the tunnel’s entrance then search for the enemy and other valuable intelligence.
The Tunnel Rat not only had to dodge the various savage booby traps set by the Viet Cong, but typically only carried 6-7 rounds of ammunition with him even though the tunnels were commonly used to house up to a few dozen enemy combatants.
After completing a search, many American and South Vietnamese units would rig the tunnels with C-4 explosives or bring in the always productive flamethrowers to flush out or kill any remaining hostiles.
Tunnel rats were generally small guys, (165 cm (5 ft 5 in) and under), who were able to maneuver more comfortably in the narrow tunnels. Tom Mangold and John Penycate, authors of one of the definitive accounts of tunnel warfare during the Vietnam War, reported that the U.S. tunnel rats were almost exclusively European (Italian, Irish) or Hispanic (Mexican Americans).
Tunnel Rats first garnered public attention in January 1966, after a combined U.S. and Australian operation against the Củ Chi tunnels in Bình Dương Province, known as Operation Crimp. The “Diehards” of the U.S. Army’s 1st Engineer Battalion, whose exploits are featured in Mangold and Penycate’s book, later claimed a special place for tunnel rats in American military history during their rotation through the Cu Chi District of South Vietnam in 1969.
Paul Plante says
I was in that area of VEET NAM where the tunnels of Cu Chi were located.
They extended some 13 miles or more, from an area out near Cambodia where I was back to and under the big Cu Chi base camp of the 25th Division, and had been started by the Viet Minh in their war against the French, who they handily defeated.
In February of 1969, some Viet Cong came out of those tunnels inside the Cu Chi base camp and blew up a bunch of Chinook helicopters, and then ran around inside the base camp raaising general hell, which is what the game is mall about, afterall.
Paul Plante says
Tunnel Rats in VEET NAM had to be small because the people who made those tunnels were small.
There was simply no way an average size American soldier was even going to fit down those “spider holes” leading into and out of the tunnels.
If anyone is further interested, a good source of information is Tropic Lightning News http://www.25thida.org/TLN/ , the 25th Infantry Division newspaper, which has plenty of stories and pictures of what that area of VEET NAM looked like in reality, and no, it doesn’t resemble Kansas or Chicago.
The 6 Jan. 1969 edition http://www.25thida.org/TLN/tln4-01.htm shows some troops in the vicinity of a bunker complex, which being camoflaged by experts at camoflage, were hard to detect.
Scroll down the page and there is a picture of a real tunnel rat.
Paul Plante says
And not to be priggish here, but it would be considered insulting to call the Viet Minh the Viet Cong.
The name Viet Cong comes from the phrase “cong san Viet Nam,” meaning “Vietnamese communist.”
The term was intended to be derogatory and dismissive, so another translation would be “Vietnamese commie.”
There is an interesting article on that subject in The Diplomat entitled “The True Origin of the Term ‘Viet Cong’” by Brett Reilly, which informs us as follows concerning the term Viet Cong, who we grunts simply called Charley, to wit:
“Who won and who lost in the great Tet Offensive against the cities?” Walter Cronkite asked his audience in February 1968.
“The Viet Cong did not win by a knockout, but neither did we.”
“The referees of history may make it a draw.”
Today, the 50th anniversary of the Tet Offensive, a unanimous decision has not yet been reached.
Even the very nature of the insurgent “Viet Cong” has eluded the referees of history.
Instead, most remain locked in two competing camps of Orthodox and Revisionist scholars.
Their opposing interpretations of the term “Viet Cong” are at once a symptom of the larger battle for the meaning of America’s war in Vietnam, but also a means to transcend that dead-end debate.
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I should say based on my own experiences post-VEET NAM that many of those “scholars” on VEET NAM never served there, or in the military at all, which they somehow think gives them an unprejudiced view, as if never having been in combat against the VC gave them a superior view, which takes us back to that article, as follows:
The Orthodox school is familiar to anyone who has taken a college course on the war or read Pulitzer Prize winners like Frances FitzGerald’s “Fire in the Lake” or Neil Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie.”
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I have read Neil Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie,” and truthfully, I am not sure what this author means when he says that work represents the “Orthodox school,” whatever that is supposed to mean to a VEET NAM combat veteran, given that “A Bright Shining Lie” is about the life of Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann and the United States involvement in the Vietnam War.
As to Vann, he was voluntarily assigned to South Vietnam in 1962 as an adviser to Colonel Huỳnh Văn Cao, commander of the ARVN IV Corps.
In the thick of the anti-guerrilla war against the Viet Cong, Vann became concerned with the way in which the war was being prosecuted, in particular the disastrous Battle of Ap Bac, which was a real major-league ****-up.
As to the Battle of Ấp Bắc, it was a major battle fought on 2 January 1963 during the Vietnam War, in Định Tường Province (now part of Tiền Giang Province), South Vietnam.
On 28 December 1962 US intelligence detected the presence of a radio transmitter along with a sizable force of Viet Cong (VC) soldiers, reported to number around 120, in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong Province, home of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) 7th Infantry Division.
To destroy the VC force, the South Vietnamese and their US advisers planned to attack Ap Tan Thoi from three directions by using two provincial Civil Guard battalions and elements of the 11th Infantry Regiment, ARVN 7th Infantry Division.
The infantry units would be supported by artillery, M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and helicopters.
On the morning of 2 January 1963, unaware that their battle plans had been leaked to the enemy, the South Vietnamese Civil Guards spearheaded the attack by marching toward Ap Tan Thoi from the south.
However, when they reached the hamlet of Ap Bac, southeast of Ap Tan Thoi, they were immediately pinned down by elements of the VC 261st Battalion.
Shortly afterwards, three companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment were committed into battle in northern Ap Tan Thoi, but they too could not overcome the VC soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the area.
Just before midday, further reinforcements were flown in from Tan Hiep.
The 15 US helicopters ferrying the troops were riddled by VC gunfire and five helicopters were lost as a result.
The ARVN 4th Mechanized Rifle Squadron was then deployed to rescue the South Vietnamese soldiers and US aircrews who were trapped at the southwest end of Ap Bac, but its commander was highly reluctant to move heavy M113 APCs across the local terrain.
Ultimately, their presence made little difference as the VC stood its ground and killed more than a dozen South Vietnamese M113 crew members in the process.
Late in the afternoon, the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion was dropped onto the battlefield and, in a scene that characterized much of the day’s fighting, were pinned down and could not break the NLF’s line of defense.
Under the cover of darkness the VC withdrew from the battlefield, having won their first major victory.
To the Oriental mind, psychology is everything in winning a conflict, and Charley was very good at the art.
But back to the difference between the Viet Minh, who were nationalists fighting against the French for their country, and the Viet Cong, who were fighting to unify Viet Nam after it was partitioned subsequent to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, we have to go back to that history as follows:
Small-scale military actions, which would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War, started in the late 1950s, when South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem instituted an anti-Communist campaign aimed at rooting out “left behind” Viet Minh forces.
So, by the late 1950s, the French have been defeated and are gone, the country has been partitioned into the North for the Communists and South for the non-Commies, and the tunnels of Cu Chi in Hau Hghia province used by the Viet Minh in their war against the French, which were built over a period of 25 years that began sometime in the late 1940s as an improvised response of a poorly equipped peasant army to its enemy’s high-tech ordnance, helicopters, artillery, bombers and chemical weapons continued in use against a new enemy, which was to be us.
As to these “left-behind” Viet Minh, according to the partition agreement, they were to have gone north.
However, that would force them to leave their ancestral villages and the graves of their ancestors, so they stayed behind, but were still Viet Minh, which takes us back to the history as follows:
At that time, North Vietnam was hoping for an election, promised under the Geneva Accords of 1954, that would unite North and South Vietnam.
It was also worried about inciting the United States into directly supporting South Vietnam, and had recommended a policy of avoiding battle at all costs.
However, Diem’s campaign was too successful to allow them to do nothing, and small-scale actions broke out across the country.
North Vietnam remained worried about US involvement and refused any sort of military support, forcing the remaining Viet Minh to retreat into inaccessible areas in the hills and river estuaries.
A stalemate of sorts followed, as South Vietnamese forces took so long to reach these areas that the guerrilla fighters were able to retreat with little difficulty.
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And there I will take a pause for the moment.
Paul Plante says
And here, since this is about the tunnel rats, and the extensive tunnel network in VEET NAM that I consider an incredible engineering feat, I’m going to jump forward in time from the late-1950’s to 1966 and Operation Crimp (8–14 January 1966), also known as the Battle of the Ho Bo Woods, a place I remember quite well as a good place to get your *** killed.
Operation Crimp was a joint US-Australian military operation during the Vietnam War, which took place 20 kilometres (12 mi) north of Cu Chi in Binh Duong Province, South Vietnam.
The operation targeted a key Viet Cong headquarters that was believed to be concealed underground, and involved two brigades of the US 1st Infantry Division including the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR), which was attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade.
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Focus on the words “concealed underground.”
We would bomb the **** out of those areas, especially with the B-52’s, which left huge craters in the ground, and the Viet Cong would come in afterwards and drag all the trees that were knocked down and scattered about over to the craters where they would criss-cross them in layers about four feet thick, and then they would cover those over with dirt and dig tunnels from one to the next, so that they had virtually impregnable underground cities in the ground that were very hard to detect.
Getting back to the Battle of the Ho Bo W00ds:
Heavy fighting resulted in significant casualties on both sides, but the combined American and Australian force was able to uncover an extensive tunnel network covering more than 200 kilometres (120 mi).
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And believe me, having been there as an infantryman, they were dreaming if they thought they could conquer the enemy in those tunnels.
My unit was pinned down in a similar situation in 1969, where a Lt. led his platoon right into the middle of a bunker complex and he sat down on a berm right in front of what turned out to be a port for a machine gun and he ended up like a piece of Swiss cheese before it was all over.
In the meantime, airstrike after airstrike kept coming in dropping 500 lb bombs, and for all the good they did, they might as well have been spitting on them.
Getting back to that battle:
The operation was the largest allied military action mounted during the war in South Vietnam to that point, and the first fought at division level.
Despite some success, the allied force was only able to partially clear the area and it remained a key communist transit and supply base throughout the war.
The tunnels were later used as a staging area for the attack on Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive before they were largely destroyed by heavy bombing from American B-52 bombers in 1970, ending their utility.
The battle began at 09:30 on 8 January with heavy American preparatory fire from artillery, as well as napalm and airstrikes from B-52 bombers which resulted in significant defoliation.
Soon after the airmobile operation commenced with the first American units being inserted by helicopter to the north, west and south.
The US 3rd Infantry Brigade—under the command of Colonel William Brodbeck—was subsequently inserted by helicopter and by road.
The brigade headquarters and command element departed Di An in convoy and reached Trung Lap on the western boundary of the brigade’s area of operations by midday.
Concurrently, two battalions were inserted by helicopter to the south-west, one blocking the south side of the Ho Bo Woods while the other conducted a sweep.
The Americans were in contact almost immediately, although the engagements were generally small scale, or involving snipers.
Meanwhile the brigade’s third battalion moved by road to Trung Lap and then moved on foot to its assigned search area.
In the north, 1RAR was inserted into its new landing zone—LZ March—3 kilometres (1.9 mi) to the south-west.
With B Company securing the site, the battalion moved on foot to the line of departure but not before they were mistakenly engaged by US helicopter gunships and artillery fire.
However, after the Australians established communications, the shelling was halted and they began their advance.
No sooner had the lead elements—D Company under the command of Major Ian Fisher—emerged into the cleared area that was originally to have been used as the battalion’s LZ, when the forward platoon came under fire from Viet Cong positions in the tree-line on the north-east corner.
In the action which followed, six Australians from 12 Platoon were wounded, including platoon commander Lieutenant Jim Bourke, who was shot through the jaw but remained in command until he passed out from loss of blood.
Meanwhile two medics who attempted to move forward to treat the casualties were themselves shot and killed.
Preece moved to push his other companies around each flank of D Company, and towards the battalion’s original blocking position.
Soon they were also in contact with small groups of Viet Cong from positions behind trees and in bunkers, while others popped up from spider holes and tunnel entrances; it became apparent to the Australians that they had stumbled across a significant Viet Cong force in extensive fortifications, sufficient to hold a battalion.
B Company, under the command of Major Ian McFarlane, also uncovered a small dug-in hospital with simple transfusion equipment, documents and bandages.
Meanwhile, the remaining battalions of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade had also been inserted.
The 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment flew into LZ April at 12:00, while 2/503rd Battalion arrived at LZ May at 14:30.
With the insertion going largely according to plan, the brigades began their advance eastwards.
Converging on the suspected location of the communist headquarters, a thorough search of the area yielded little, and it was believed that the Viet Cong had withdrawn earlier in response to the initial Australian advance.
Amid strong resistance, the Australians were made to fight their way through the maze of bunkers, punji stakes and booby traps but they were eventually able to force a Viet Cong regional force company to withdraw as they continued their advance.
The area was heavily seeded with trip wires connected to shells and grenades dangling from branches, one of which blew McFarlane and several of his men off their feet.
The defenders subsequently withdrew, with 7th Cu Chi Battalion forced north and 3rd Quyet Thang Battalion to the east.
Suspecting they were being drawn into a trap—as one of the American battalions of the brigade had been previously during Operation Hump—the Australians moved into a tightly defended perimeter before dark and waited for the communists to counter-attack.
As night fell, movement was detected along a trench on the C Company perimeter when a squad of Viet Cong attempted to infiltrate the Australian position.
Initially believing the movement to be another Australian patrol that had just departed on a clearing patrol, the machine-gunner on sentry duty finally opened fire at the last safe moment, killing one of the infiltrators at point-blank range and wounding a number of others before they withdrew.
Minor actions continued into the night, with small groups of Viet Cong able to pop up undetected and then disappear at will from within the Australian defensive position.
The searching units were unable to locate Viet Cong in large numbers but experienced a significant number of sudden engagements and ambushes throughout the day, and it became clear that the communists were using tunnels for movement and concealment.
Preece suspected that the area was honeycombed with tunnels and that the communist headquarters that he had been tasked to destroy was in fact located beneath the feet of the battalion.
The Australians were the only battalion in the US 173rd Brigade to strike significant resistance, and by the end of the first day 1RAR had suffered a total of three killed and 15 wounded, while the artillery Forward Observer from 105 Field Battery had also been killed.
The battalion spent a sleepless night and in the early hours of the morning there were a number of short exchanges of fire as small groups of Viet Cong returned to the area.
Not wanting to fire the machine-guns for fear of giving their positions away or hitting friendly troops, the Australians resorted to using grenades forward of the perimeter.
Meanwhile, in the US 3rd Infantry Brigade area of operations contact had been light, with only six Viet Cong killed.
Paul Plante says
And here is an interesting video about the Tunnels of Cu Chi that was made by the Vietnamese:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19ejFuEyHyk
It is in Vietnamese, but has subtitles.