The United States and Taiwan on Thursday signed their first agreement under the Biden administration, establishing a Coast Guard Working Group to coordinate policy, following China’s passing of a law that allows its coast guard to fire on foreign vessels.
The new government of US President Joe Biden has moved to reassure Chinese-claimed Taiwan that its commitment to the island is rock solid.
The question is, if China wants to move on Taiwan, just what is the US response going to be? It may not be the outcome you’d expect, and may be a major embarrassment to US forces deployed in the South China Sea.
In late January 2019, China released footage showing off its new intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Dongfeng (“East Wind”) DF-26. The DF-26 has been dubbed the “Guam Killer”.
All war is about terrain and resources – these are the raw materials of power. And when multiple entities decide they MUST control a certain place or asset, conflict is inevitable. One such place is the South China Sea. The South China Sea is the geographic location that is keeping the brightest and most connected military thinkers awake at night. Sprawling 3.5 million sq km, the SCS is a shared body of water touching multiple key nations, and is a critical chokepoint for global trade.
Approximately 1/3 of the value of all global trade (~$3 trillion/yr) transits the SCS. It is the main route for all Chinese on-water trade to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Many shipments to/from the Americas must also transit the SCS.
Given its implacable geographic limitations, the region is a true zero-sum pie. Any strategic advance for one nation comes at a cost to the others. China, and all of its neighbors, have every reason to maximize their own stake in the SCS region. Though China prefers subversion and multi-layered strategies at the global scale (see my threads on #BeltandRoad at the end of this one), they are a bully in their own backyard. Going back as far as the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, China pushes the limits.
There is a diplomatic geography as well. The US has littered the region with “tripwire” agreements that obligate us to rise to the defense of Japan, Philippines, Thailand, SKorea, and Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression. Given the strategic importance of the region and the interdependence of rival nations upon the SCS, China knew that any overly-hostile act would do more harm than good. Their best bet was to simply begin staking territorial claims in the international waters.
However, the SCS is free of any significant mid-sea landmasses, outside of the tiny Paracel and Spratly archipelagos (island chains). These miniscule islands were not durable enough for any form of infrastructure, and so could not be claimed via “squatter’s rights”.
Since 2013, the nation has invested countless dollars and man-hours into dredging and building of artificial islands throughout the Spratly and Paracel chains, with 3200 acres of new “land” in the Spratlys alone.
This is a very different pattern of behavior than China has used in #BeltandRoad projects. But, there’s a common thread: The buildout of DUAL-USE infrastructure. Despite the claims of peaceful civilian/maritime uses, the assets are ideal for military use.
China is a master of the weaponized Hegelian Dialectic: Problem–>Reaction–>Solution They create a problem that provokes a specific reaction, leading to their solution. Synthesis of a fabricated issue in a way that favors China. Seem familiar? The axis of the world turns upon control of four resources: Protein Water Energy Firepower The first is the subject of this thread. China’s enormous population demands massive amounts of protein. And war is on for it.
Having established the “what”, we can now explore the “why”. “Logistics is a map of human intent”, let’s look at the assets themselves to infer intent. 𝘎𝘦𝘰𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘩𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘧𝘳𝘢𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘊𝘢𝘱𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴. The easternmost landmasses in the Spratly Islands sit a mere 130 km from the Philippines’ Palawan Island. The Paracels are less than 350 km from Vietnam. However, by occupying these two chains in tandem, China is mounting a claim that their “littoral” (coastal) waters now extend an incredible 1260 km from the Chinese coast. They’ve effectively annexed the entire South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory.
This has massive implications across the commercial, geopolitical, and military domains. The obvious one is that by making this critical sea-route a part of China, they could begin charging tolls to the massive number of ships that transit the waters daily.
This is the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly chain. Fully completed in 2017, satellite imagery shows something startling – a full-scale airport in the middle of the SCS. This is no small feat of finance or engineering.
In addition, China’s dredging operations resulted in deep-water harbors at the Subi and Mischief Reefs. Island supply chains depend on maritime support. Flying in fuel, consumables, assets, and building materials is cost-prohibitive long term. Logistics doesn’t lie.
The location of Subi Reef’s naval base is no mere coincidence. I’ve bracketed the primary maritime route through the SCS in orange. Maritime law enforcement, interdiction, and military operations are all easily supported, while also funneling vessel traffic.
As one can see, the infrastructure and geography enable significant combined military operations across air, land, surface, and subsurface domains in the SCS. However, just as important to China is the ability of these islands to extend a defensive perimeter even further.
Any nation concerned with mainland defense against the United States will be aware of the tremendous firepower our Navy brings to bear. We can deliver crushing force from far-out on water. Distance is a defender’s best ally against the US Navy. A single USN carrier strike group boasts: – Nimitz-class aircraft carrier (up to 90 aircraft) – Guided missile cruiser (w/ Tomahawk cruise missiles) – 2 guided missile destroyers – Resupply vessel – Attack submarine The cruiser and sub are the key assets here. A Ticonderoga-class cruiser or Los Angeles-class submarine armed with Block III Tomahawks has an effective strike range of more than 1600 km. At that range, the Chinese mainland is reachable from nearly anywhere in the SCS. The defensive bubble must be pushed out further.
Recognizing this, in 2017 China began installing advanced A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) surface-to-air missile batteries on several of their SCS island claims. This map shows the effective range of the batteries for the known SAM assets on the islands.
Even more menacing, however, is deployment of the DF-26 to the SCS theater in July of this year. An intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-26 is highly versatile and capable of destroying ships or ground targets at more than 5,000 km. Guam is no longer safe. Guam is home to a critical US installation called Naval Base Guam. It is a major base for the entire Pacific theater, supporting naval operations for the USN Seventh Fleet. It is attractive for its own distance from traditional missile strikes.
While a conventional warhead on the DF-26 would do massive damage to a ship or ground installation, the missile is also reputed to be nuclear-capable. This has earned the DF-26 the nickname “Guam Killer”. And if Guam isn’t safe, the entire SE Asia theater isn’t.
It is not that China simply wants to control some islands. This is about an strategic realignment of power in the entire region. The Seventh Fleet was once alpha dog. No more. For decades, the US Navy’s blue-water prowess has buttressed US diplomatic and economic efforts with the subtle threat of overwhelming force. But there’s a logistical limit to this paradigm: Distance.
If an adversary can push the US Navy beyond its practical logistical limits by building a big-enough integrated air defense system (IADS), then the US’ biggest stick is broken. The point of an effective IADS is to build overlapping layers and modes of defense.
Paul Plante says
If I remember correctly, Viet Nam ate China’s lunch in that war in 1979.
Paul Plante says
China pushed the limits back in October 1950 when they crossed the Yalu from China into North Korea to blood their troops against the United States Marines.
Thus ended their fear of U.S. military might.
As to that conflict with Viet Nam, a publication called THE DIPLOMAT had an interesting analysis of it in an article entitled “The Sino-Vietnam War and China’s Long Route to Winning – A little-known war helped shape the future of Southeast Asia” by James Maclaren on May 24, 2019, to wit:
The remote valleys and mountains of Cao Bang province are peaceful places rich in natural resources and home to the Tay, Nung, Dao, and Hmong peoples of Vietnam.
The province sits on the Sino-Vietnamese border and in 1979 was at the hinge of a territorial dispute that would define the strategic politics of Southeast Asia and beyond until the present day.
Historians considering the short border war of 1979 between China and Vietnam have long concluded that the Chinese invasion into the north of Vietnam – an attempt to exert some control over Vietnamese expansion in Indochina — was a military failure.
Vastly superior Chinese forces were met with determined resistance by a regular Vietnamese force capable of successful guerrilla tactics.
end quotes
What is interesting is that the guerilla tactics of the Vietnamese, and they were indeed good at the art, and art form it is to the Oriental mind, worked against the Chinese, who themselves were masters at the art.
Getting back to that analysis, we have:
The analysis continues that after heavy losses Chinese forces sulkily withdrew back across the border, never to trouble the peace again.
Indeed ex-U.S. president Jimmy Carter recently tweeted that unlike America, which has been in a state of almost permanent conflict since 1979, China since the same year has not fought a war of any kind.
Carter’s point seems to be that the Chinese eschewed war in return for domestic modernization and industrial development.
However, a more compelling idea may be that China knew how to conduct a short, limited war in order to set the conditions for a long and wide peace.
In War and Peace, Strategy Matters
The Chinese premier at the time of the Sino-Vietnamese War was Deng Xiaoping, a highly rational leader who understood the art of strategy probably better than most.
His country was desperately in need of domestic modernization and reform.
China was being squeezed both from the north — by a Soviet Union at the height of its military power — and to the south, where a unified Vietnam was steadily gaining strength under the stewardship of its Soviet partner.
Following the border disputes of the 1960s Beijing’s relationship with the Soviet Union was at a low ebb, while relations with Hanoi had been steadily deteriorating since the end of the Vietnam War and U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.
Hanoi’s treatment of ethnic Chinese in expelling them from the country and decision to engage in conflict in Cambodia to limit Chinese influence there were seen as ingratitude for the economic and military assistance China had given to Hanoi during the Vietnam War.
The alliance between Hanoi and Moscow and the Soviet-led rallying of other countries to encircle China meant Deng confronted the real possibility of a future war on two fronts.
What he wanted was to create a secure international environment in order to conduct domestic reform.
Deng’s plan was to teach Vietnam a lesson while minimizing the possibility of a wider conflict or serious engagement with the Soviet Union.
In achieving this he faced domestic opposition.
Critics saw a shift to conflict against Vietnam as a diversion of resources from deterring the Soviet Union on the northern border.
Others would point to deficiencies in the Chinese military, which was seen as unprepared for a serious conflict.
Many in the Communist Party thought a war with Vietnam would create a long-term hostile situation in Southeast Asia — and worse, risked drawing the Soviet Union into a full-scale conflict.
end quotes
So there is some background, what I think is some necessary background, to understand the thinking of the Chinese today as they weaponize that area over there as a deterrent to the United States.
Afterall, it was Sun Tzu who said “Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack.”
Paul Plante says
That article from THE DIPLOMAT entitled “The Sino-Vietnam War and China’s Long Route to Winning – A little-known war helped shape the future of Southeast Asia” by James Maclaren on May 24, 2019, continues as follows:
Deng was a pragmatist and realized his power in the country was not yet consolidated.
He had particular concerns about the state of his armed forces, whose effectiveness and competence he doubted.
He realized that if any plans to reform were to succeed, it might have to be on the back of failure.
And if that were the case then failure needed to be managed.
A tightly managed war would provide him with the control he needed to bring about the reform he wanted.
end quotes
Here is some interesting insight into the thinking of the Chinese, which is in line with Sun Tzu’s aphorism that “In war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.”
As Sun Tzu said, strategy is, simply, the art and science of options.
It is a matter of understanding current options, creating new options, and choosing among them.
Strategic decision-making involves thinking about the long-term course one will take through a broad competitive landscape.
Strategy provides the direction for operations.
Operational planning and decision-making, in turn guides the tactical decisions made in the heat of battle.
Getting back to the Sino-Vietnamese War, we have:
It was here that Deng’s strength as a strategist came to the fore.
He calculated that provided his own military objectives were modest, the Soviet Union would not be inclined to move forces committed to Europe.
A short war would also limit the cost while being sufficient to teach Vietnam the “lesson” it needed.
As for the West, he assessed that there would be no U.S. opposition in breaking up a Soviet-led communist consolidation of Indochina; there should only be the opportunity of accelerating the normalization of relations.
With the idea of the war launched, Deng set about making it so.
He first laid the diplomatic foundations with the United States, Japan, and other nations in Southeast Asia.
Shrewdly he did not follow the practice of previous Chinese leaders in emphasizing China’s strength – he stressed China’s poverty, backwardness, and its willingness to learn from Western countries.
In Southeast Asia he labelled Vietnam as the “Cuba of the East” and emphasized Chinese solidarity.
A peace agreement signed with Japan and smiling normalization summits with the United States provided the international support Deng believed he needed.
Did It Go As Planned?
Deng’s generals attacked with over 200,000 troops across the Vietnamese border with the intention of capturing six regional capitals in a few days, at which point victory would be declared.
This is where it went wrong.
The 50,000 opposing Vietnamese were highly organized and had considerable combat experience gained in wars in Cambodia and against the Americans.
The Chinese tactics were outdated, and their forces suffered from poor levels of organization and inadequate logistics.
Far from repeating the successes of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chinese became bogged down and suffered heavy casualties.
It was not the quick, decisive campaign the generals had predicted, and Deng had hoped for.
Eventually and with great effort they would capture three of the regional capital objectives.
But to Deng limited success in the field did not automatically amount to strategic failure.
He had held onto the reins of all instruments of national power in this conflict, setting limits on the duration, cost, and scope of the operation.
When events turned bad, Deng would have none of the mission creep and talk of “just one more push” so common among ego-bruised generals and desperate politicians.
With no sign of the Soviet Union sailing over the horizon – Vietnam was important to the Soviets, but not that important — and the West ambivalent to Beijing’s actions Deng banked what he had and, to the fury of his field commanders, ordered Chinese forces to withdraw.
Paul Plante says
And going back to that article from THE DIPLOMAT entitled “The Sino-Vietnam War and China’s Long Route to Winning – A little-known war helped shape the future of Southeast Asia” by James Maclaren on May 24, 2019, it concluded as follows:
A Disappointing Success?
The military campaign was certainly not the quick decisive victory expected.
But Deng did not view victory in messianic terms.
Chinese forces withdrew in relatively good order and announced that Vietnam had been taught a lesson.
While the conflict did not bring stability to the northern border with Vietnam and did not, in the short term, cause Vietnam to cease interfering in Cambodia, Hanoi did become more docile.
The conflict had driven a wedge in the Soviet-Vietnamese axis and demonstrated clearly the limits of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, which ensured more circumspect future behavior from the Vietnamese.
The limits of Soviet preparedness to interfere in Chinese affairs had been successfully tested and shortly after withdrawing from Vietnam, China terminated the Sino-Soviet Stability Treaty.
China’s prestige in Southeast Asia was enhanced and encouraged the formation of a strong association of nations opposed to Vietnam.
Over time, the impact of the conflict would cost Vietnam economically as it found itself having to invest heavily in the resources necessary to defend itself against future Chinese aggression.
Following Soviet failure in Afghanistan and increasing Soviet weakness, Hanoi could no longer continue its aggressive posture and would finally withdraw from Cambodia in a peace made on Chinese terms.
Domestically Deng’s influence increased considerably and following the failure of the military there could be no argument against the reforms he wanted being made.
A younger, more loyal generation of senior officers would mold the image of the Chinese military to Deng’s agenda.
Rapprochement with the United States and the West did not bring the accelerated benefits Deng had hoped for.
A military assistance program did follow but it fell short of largescale arms sales.
With access to Soviet technology now closed the Chinese would begin to build the indigenous military-industrial complexes it relies upon today.
Out of necessity grew a military-economic capability that allows China an independence of strategic capability probably second only to the United States.
In a world where failures of strategy surround us, the leadership of Deng is striking, if only for how often it is overlooked.
Rational and sharp his decision making roamed across war and peace, domestic and international politics, and fused the national instruments of power.
Of course, some of it did not work as it should.
But when you consider how the region changed in China’s favor and the domestic reforms that Deng was subsequently able to make, it puts to shame more recent strategic policymaking to bring about regional stability.