October 18, 2025

11 thoughts on “Did NATO Expansion Lead to Ukraine War?

  1. Mitch McConnell: “Standing with our allies against Russian aggression isn’t charity.”

    “In fact — it’s a direct investment in replenishing America’s arsenal with American weapons built by American workers.”

    “Expanding our defense industrial base puts America in a stronger position to out-compete China.”

    **********************************

    The dude is DAFT!

    Out of touch with reality.

    He has parked his head so far up in his *** that he can no longer see the light of day.

    According to readily available information that comes from the DOD, it will take years to replenish those stocks, to wit:

    55 mm ammunition. This category consists of a wide variety of non-precision projectiles, mostly the basic high explosive (HE) shell (M795) but also specialty shells like extended range HE, smoke, illumination, and marking (white phosphorus).

    The United States has provided about 1,000,000 projectiles to Ukraine.

    It continues to provide some, though these may be pass-throughs from allies like South Korea who don’t want to transfer lethal aid directly.

    Military planners appear to regard this as the most serious shortage since artillery constitutes the backbone of ground-based firepower.

    Rebuilding inventories at the current production rate is probably not possible because of routine U.S. training needs.

    Artillery units must fire a certain number of rounds every year to be proficient.

    Simulators can provide only a small substitute because of their limited ability to replicate all elements of the firing process.

    Annual training requirements are likely equal to the recent production levels since these programs have been around for a long time, the budget levels have been relatively constant for several years, and there has been no need to increase inventories.

    Current production is 3,250 per month.

    DOD says that it can get that rate up to 20,000 per month (240,000 per year) by the spring of 2023 and 40,000 per month (480,000 per year) by 2025.

    At this surge rate, it would take about six years to rebuild inventories allowing for normal peacetime usage and assuming no further transfers from inventory.

    That is a big assumption because of Ukraine’s high shell usage.

    In April, the United States announced it was sending 155 mm howitzers to Ukraine.

    Those probably arrived in May and began firing intensively in June.

    It is not clear how many of the million rounds they have used in the six months of operations, but, assuming Ukraine has one month of artillery ammunition left on hand, that comes out to 143,000 rounds fired a month, or about 4,800 rounds per day.

    Combined with shells fired from Ukraine’s Soviet-era artillery, this is in the vicinity of the 6,000–7,000 per day that Ukraine has said it was firing (and which was considered inadequate).

    Even the 2025 surge rate would satisfy only a third of this need.

    To bridge the gap, other countries will have to provide ammunition, and a lot of it.

    This could become a crisis.

    With the front line now mostly stationary, artillery has become the most important combat arm.

    Ukraine will never run out of 155 mm ammunition―there will always be some flowing in―but artillery units might have to ration shells and fire at only the highest priority targets.

    This would have an adverse battlefield effect.

    The more constrained the ammunition supply, the more severe the effect.

    As an offset, the United States has provided 105 mm howitzers and ammunition―36 howitzers and 180,000 shells.

    Because these shells are lighter and have a shorter range, the number of howitzers and shells will need to be very large to provide an adequate substitute.

    – “Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems” by Mark F. Cancian, Published January 9, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

  2. That should read 155 above here, not 55:

    155 mm precision (Excalibur).

    In 2007 the United States fielded Excalibur, an artillery shell guided by GPS.

    The firing unit has only to input the coordinates, and the projectile guides itself to the target with an accuracy of two meters.

    This projectile is far superior to the previous precision artillery munition,
    Copperhead, which required a spotter using a laser designator.

    A complementary system, called Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munition (C-DAEM in the budget documents), is also GPS guided but uses submunitions to attack personnel and vehicles.

    It is just being fielded.

    (The Army needs a better name here, as a CSIS colleague has argued.)

    DOD says it has sent 5,200 “precision-guided 155 mm artillery rounds” to Ukraine.

    Assuming these are all Excalibur, then it will take 84 months (7 years) to replace the inventory at the recent production rate and 48 months (4 years) at the surge rate.

    The long-range precision guidance kit, a cheaper but slightly less accurate precision guidance system also exists.

    It consists of a mechanism screwed into the nose of a standard artillery projectile, thus greatly expanding the potential inventory of precision munitions.

    However, the program is just finishing development and has not yet entered full-rate production, though it might be available in the future.

    Ongoing battlefield usage constitutes the great challenge here.

    The United States has been sending about 1,000 of these precision projectiles per month.

    However, Excalibur’s annual production is only about 1,000.

    Total production since the beginning of the program has been about 15,000, but many of those were expended during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and for testing and training.

    The inventory is thus likely to be small, and the United States may soon run out of Excalibur projectiles to send.

    GMLRS (described below) may provide an alternative, but the number of HIMARS launchers (20) is much more limited than the number of howitzers capable of firing Excalibur (146).

    – “Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems” by Mark F. Cancian, Published January 9, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

  3. Javelin.

    Javelin, a long-range, infantry portable precision anti-tank missile, became the iconic weapon of the early phases of the conflict.

    It was easy to use, provided in large numbers, and, as a result, instrumental in stopping the initial Russian offensive.

    The United States has provided 8,500 to Ukraine.

    However, further transfers have stopped because inventories are at the point where the risk to other war plans, for example, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or in the Baltic countries, has become too high.

    At the recent production rate of about 1,000 per year, it will take 149 months (12.5 years) to rebuild the inventory to the pre-conflict level.

    At the accelerated rates that DOD and Lockheed Martin have announced, it will take about 80 months (6.5 years).

    This assumes no further transfers and no diversion of production to other allies.

    The government has begun this process.

    Congress authorized multiyear procurement of up to 12,050 Excalibur rounds, and DOD recently awarded an $84 million contract for 1,000 rounds.

    – “Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems” by Mark F. Cancian, Published January 9, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

  4. High Mobility Artillery Rockets System (HIMARS).

    If Javelin was the iconic weapon of the early phases of the war, HIMARS is the iconic weapon of the later phases.

    Although “HIMARS” is often used to refer to both the launcher and the missile, this analysis refers to the launcher, a modified heavy truck with rocket pods on the back.

    (The United States has a tracked version of the system for armored units, called the Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS) but has not yet transferred any to Ukraine. However, the United Kingdom and Germany have together sent 10.)

    The United States has transferred only 20 HIMARS to Ukraine.

    Because numbers are so low and the production line is hot, replacement of the transferred articles will not take long: at the recent production rate, three years, and at the surge rate, two and a half years.

    Indeed, DOD recently let a $431 million contract to Lockheed Martin for increased HIMARS production.

    Ukraine’s challenge is that it has only 30 systems (including MLRS) to cover 530 miles (850 kilometers) of active front.

    That means just one system per 18 miles of front.

    Ukraine needs more.

    However, the United States has been reluctant to take systems from existing U.S. units or to provide the heavier and more complicated MLRS system.

    (Note: The DOD fact sheet cites 38 HIMARS provided, but 18 will be new production and not delivered for several years.)

    – “Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems” by Mark F. Cancian, Published January 9, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

  5. Ukraine has lost around 400,000 men. Russia has lost around 50,000 men.

    Now, explain to me how the Ukraine is ‘winning’ anything?

    We The People have been warned, nicely. It is not our war to fight, support, or even pay for.

    As I remember, Russia helped us beat Nazi Germany.

    Editor’s Note: Russia defeated the Nazis all by themselves. WW II was Russia’s war, they lost close to 27 Million. Everyone needs to shut up and let them defend their border. Something the US should be doing.

    1. Stuart’s Note: If Russia wanted the Ukraine they have the means to take it any day they wish…As to Russians defeating Nazi’s all by themselves? Tell that to the ones the US troops that fought them.

      As to me shutting up? Don’t hold your breath.

      Editor’s Note: I apologize, but did not mean for you to personally shut up, but people that think the US had much to do with defeating the Nazis. Russia fought that war, the numbers tell that. The US casualties in the Pacific were much higher than the fight in Europe, a fight the US came into very late. The Mirror History Notes has covered this many times.

      1. It is a well known fact, or used to be, anyway, that Frank Roosevelt would rather have had Russians dying to defeat the Nazis, as opposed to Americans.

        Hence, all the equipment the US supplied to Russia, with from 1941 through 1945, the U.S. sending $11.3 billion, or $180 billion in 2016 dollars, in goods and services to the Soviets, so that by the end of June 1944 the United States had sent to the Soviets under lend-lease more than 11,000 planes; over 6,000 tanks and tank destroyers; and 300,000 trucks and other military vehicles.

  6. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).

    This is the guided munition that HIMARS fires.

    Because of its long range (about 45 miles) and high accuracy (within 10 meters), it has apparently been devastating to Russian logistics hubs and headquarters units.

    DOD has been tightlipped about how many it has sent to Ukraine, saying only “thousands.”

    Similarly, the usage rate is unclear, with General Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying in early September that Ukrainians had hit 400 targets using HIMARS.

    Since the systems had been in Ukraine about a month, that would indicate a relatively low rate of usage.

    A low usage rate is also consistent with the small number of launchers.

    The recent U.S. production rate is 5,000 rockets per year and could increase to 10,000 per year or more.

    That would be adequate to handle 400 rockets a month.

    Further, the United States has a relatively large inventory.

    DOD has received about 50,000 rockets since the beginning of the program, though many were used for training and testing and in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    The remaining inventory is probably 25,000 to 30,000.

    If DOD gave a third to Ukraine, that would provide 8,000 to 10,000 rockets.

    The bottom line is the United States can supply rockets at the rate of 400 per month indefinitely.

    On the other hand, if usage rises to the Excalibur level of 1,000 a month, then inventories will decline gradually, hitting a critical state after about 20 months.

    That would be in early 2024.

    By that time, however, the production rate might be approaching the surge level, which could sustain that higher level of usage.

    However, high usage combined with a manufacturing lead time substantially longer than 17 months would create a period in 2024–2025 when usage would be capped, though at increasingly high levels, until manufacturing reached the surge rate.

    – “Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems” by Mark F. Cancian, Published January 9, 2023 https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

  7. Stinger.

    The United States last bought Stinger in 2004.

    (Actually, these were not new production missiles but upgrades of older missiles to Block I configuration.)

    Budget documents indicate that total production was about 2,900.

    The Army had planned to procure up to 11,000, but the end of the Cold War and the recognition that regional adversaries like North Korea had weak air forces drove large cuts to ground-based air defense systems.

    The production line is apparently warm because of continuing foreign military sales.

    However, the number produced annually is likely small, in the vicinity of 100.

    When the United States bought Stingers, production reached about 350 a year, but that was 20 years ago.

    The U.S. Army has let a contract for additional Stingers and Congress has authorized more production, but it will take a long time to replace the lost inventory.

    This may not be a problem, as the U.S. Army is developing several new air defense systems like M-SHORAD and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability.

    Because of these new systems about to enter the force, the United States may not need Stingers as urgently.

    Indeed, more Stingers might be sent to Ukraine with acceptable risk.

  8. What BULL****!

    I recall this same crap happening in 1969 in Viet Nam, when we would be told that there was a shortage of 105 rounds, so that we would be limited to five rounds that day while conducting infantry operations out near the Cambodian border, which was absurd, because it would take the arty boys three of those rounds to get on target.

    And if another unit was in heavier contact, then you would get no artillery support, period.

    And that was because of budget issues, were told.

    And people wonder why we didn’t win that ******-up, sad excuse of a war, while wondering how come Joe Biden hasn’t beat the Russians yet over in Ukraine!

    Go figure!

    Probably because Joe is just as big an A-HOLE as was LBJ!

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