June 17, 2025

1 thought on “Trump bombed Syria based on Bad Intelligence…what’s new?

  1. Well done, Wayne!

    Thanks for shining a needed spotlight on these serious issues!

    This American at least very much appreciates your citizenship and especially your courage, going against the flow as you are clearly doing here.

    The problem with our so-called “intelligence agencies,” and there are a plethora of them (according to the Associated Press article “Top intel official says he meant no disrespect to Trump” by Zeke Miller on 22 July 2018, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats oversees the nation’s 17 intelligence agencies) is that they are political, and not very intelligent.

    And that is nothing new, as anyone who has studied American history well knows.

    There were huge intelligence failures during the Korean War, especially about what the Chinese might do if the U.S. crossed the 38th parallel.

    There were huge intelligence failures and outright lying by the so-called “intelligence agencies,” including the CIA, during the Viet Nam war, to the point of where JFK did not trust his intelligence agencies, nor should he have after the disastrous Bay of Pigs fiasco, which to his credit, Kennedy took responsibility for.

    The intelligence agencies completely missed Tet of 1968.

    They lied about the so-called Tonkin Gulf incident.

    At pp.204-205 of “The Devil’s Chessboard”, author David Talbot tells us as follows:

    Under Allen Dulles, the CIA would become a vast kingdom, the most powerful and least supervised agency in government.

    Dulles built his towering citadel with the strong support of President Eisenhower, who, despite occasional misgivings about the spymaster’s unrestrained ways, consistently protected him from his Washington enemies.

    The rise of Dulles’s spy complex in the 1950s would further undermine a U.S. democracy that, as (sociologist C. Wright) Mills observed, was already seriously compromised by growing corporate power.

    The mechanisms of surveillance and control that Dulles put in motion were more in keeping with an expanding empire than they were with a vibrant democracy.

    As journalist David Halberstam later observed, “The national security complex became, in the Eisenhower years, a fast-growing apparatus to allow us to do in secret what we could not do in the open.”

    “This was not just an isolated phenomenon but part of something larger going on in Washington – the transition from an isolationist America to imperial colossus.”

    “A true democracy had no need for a vast, secret security apparatus, but an imperial country did. . . .”

    “What was evolving was a closed state within an open state.”

    end quotes

    That would lead to the CIA spying on Americans during the Viet Nam war and the Church hearings.

    At pp.164-166 of “In The Company of Soldiers – A Chronicle of Combat” by Rick Atkinson, this is what we have about more CIA intelligence failures during George W. Bush’s war against Saddam Hussein:

    MARCH 26, 2003 – SOMEWHERE INSIDE IRAQ

    I arrived in the ACP at 7:30 A.M. to find Petraeus (Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division) on the phone with Wallace (Lt. General William S. Wallace, Commander, V Corps).

    His face was drawn, as if he had slept poorly.

    An intelligence officer, Lieutentant Jeanne Hull, told me that orders had come down overnight banning the term “Fedayeen,” which means “men who sacrifice themselves for a cause,” because it ostensibly invested those fighters with too much dignity.

    They were to be referred to as paramilitaries.

    (Later the approved phrase would be “terroristlike death squads.”)

    Hull estimated that there were nine to twelve Fedayeen battalions in Iraq, each with roughly six hundred fighters, including a battalion in Najaf.

    In a small blow against Orwellian excess, most officers continued to call them Fedayeen.

    Petraeus hung up and ordered Fivecoat to get the Humvee ready for a trip to the V Corps command post at Rams.

    He pushed back from the table, snapped the chin strap on his helmet, and shrugged on his flak vest.

    “Want to step outside and chat for a minute?” he asked.

    We stood fifteen feet beyond the tent flap.

    I blinked at the dust and felt grit between my molars.

    When Petraeus turned to face me, I was alarmed to see how troubled his blue eyes were.

    “This thing is turning to s**t,” he said.

    “The 3 ID is in danger of running out of food and water.”

    “They lost two Abrams and a Bradley last night, although they got the crews out.”

    “The corps commander sounds tired.”

    ******

    U.S. forces had yet to encounter the Republican Guard, but Iraqi irregulars seemed much more aggressive than anticipated and the Shiite south hardly had welcomed the invaders as liberators.

    The battlefield was nonlinear, with only a vague distinction between the front and the rear.

    “No one really saw this coming, did they?” I said.

    “No,” he replied.

    No prewar estimates had anticipated a defense of Najaf by Iraqi regular army or Republican Guard troops, nor did those estimates predict stiff resistance from paramilitary forces.

    “We did worst-case scenarios, where the enemy really put up a fight, but no one took it very seriously.”

    “We need to get lucky.”

    “The CIA really needs to pull this one out.”

    end quotes

    What I would like to hear about, if anyone is aware of it, is times when the so-called “intelligence” agencies, which are not very intelligent, got it right about something and did not lie to us.

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